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THE COST OF FREE SPEECH: FIRST
AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS OF STUDENT
ACTIVITY FUNDS-SOUTHWORTH V. GREBE1
I. INTRODUCTION

Implicit in the First Amendment is the guarantee to every individual
the freedom to express as well as associate oneself with ideas and
beliefs.2 Also rooted within the confines of the First Amendment is the
right to be free from compelled association with or expression of ideas
or beliefs with which one disagrees Universities in this country have
traditionally found these precepts integral to the education of students
and have manifested this notion by creating a forum whereby students
have the opportunity to strive for enlightenment through an unbounded
flow and interchange of thought.4 In so doing, many universities assess a
mandatory student activity fee to support and cultivate this atmosphere
of free thinking.5 However, courts are now faced with the competing
interests of those students who, while disagreeing with the views
espoused by many organizations, are nevertheless compelled to
subsidize them. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided
in Southworth v. Grebe6 that the University of Wisconsin's use of
mandatory student activity fees to fund private organizations that
engage in political and ideological activities, speech, and advocacy
violates the free speech rights of those students who object to such
funding.
This Note will first provide a synopsis of the facts and procedural
history of the Southworth case. It will further include a background of
the law by which Southworth was decided, as well as an evaluation of the
court's holding. Finally, this Note will examine the implications of the
Seventh Circuit's decision and the issues not addressed in the court's
reasoning.

1. 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998) reh'g denied, 157 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1998), cert granted
sub nom. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (1999).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n., 500 U.S. 507,516 (1991).
4. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995).
5. See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500,507 (Cal. 1993).
6. 151 F.3d 717.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Students attending the University of Wisconsin-Madison are
assessed a mandatory student activity fee each semester as a condition
of receiving grades as well as graduating.7 The official representative of
the student body, the Associated Students of Madison (ASM), has
virtually complete dominion over a portion of these fees and in turn
allocates the fees to many different activities and private organizations.8
Three University of Wisconsin students sued the Regents of the
University, challenging the distribution of fees to eighteen organizations
that use the funds to engage in political and ideological activities to
which the plaintiffs object.9 The student-plaintiffs asserted that by
compelling students to subsidize private groups whose views they
oppose, the Regents have infringed on objecting students' rights of free
speech and association.10 The district court granted summary judgment
for the plaintiffs on their freedom of speech claims and granted
injunctive relief that both barred such funding and ordered a detailed
opt-out procedure."
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
Cases involving compelled student activity funding have caused
courts to protect the First Amendment rights of students, while
"accord[ing] wide latitude to universities to define and carry out their
own educational missions. ,12 It is manifest that the First Amendment

7. See id. at 719.
8. See id. at 720 ("[W]hile the ASM has complete authority over most of the allocable
funding, the Regents have final authority to approve or disapprove the allocations of funds by
the student government under section 36.09(5) of the Wisconsin Code.").
9. The organizations which the plaintiffs opposed included
WISPIRG; the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center; the Campus Women's
Center; the UW Greens; the Madison AIDS. Support Network; the Internationalist
Socialist Organization; the Ten Percent Society; the Progressive Student Network;
Amnesty International; United States Student Association; Community Action on
Latin America; La Colectiva Cultural de Aztlan; The Militant Student Union of the
University of Wisconsin; the Student Labor Action Coalition; Student Solidarity;
Students of National Organization for Women; MADPAC; and Madison Treaty
Rights Support Group.
Id. at 720.
10. See id. at 718.
11. See id.
12. Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991,999 (2d Cir. 1992).
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encompasses the right to associate as well as the right not to associate."
However, the issue that arises when universities mandate fees for
support of political and ideological groups is whether students' First
Amendment rights can be compromised in pursuit of higher education.
The two pivotal cases on which every court addressing this issue has
relied to some extent deal with mandatory funding in a context outside
of the university setting.
In one of the earlier cases examining the constitutionality of
compelled funding, Abood v. Detroit Board Of Education Detroit
Board of Education employees claimed that mandatory unions dues,
required of both members and non-members, were used to support a
variety of political and religious activities with which they disagreed,
thereby violating their First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association. 5
The Supreme Court held that the union was
constitutionally prohibited from expending union dues for activities not
germane to the purpose of the compelled association, in this case
collective bargaining.'
Although it is not unconstitutional to use
required fees to fund political or ideological speech, even if not germane
to its function of promoting labor peace, compelling employees who
object to the advancement of that speech offends the First Amendment
notion that "an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that
in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his
conscience rather than coerced by the State."17
In 1990, the Supreme Court addressed the same issue in Keller v.
State Bar of California,8 in which members of the California State Bar
challenged the use of required 9 membership fees to finance political and
ideological activities to which they did not subscribe.2 Again the Court
held that the State Bar could only "constitutionally fund activities
germane to those goals out of the mandatory dues of all members, which
13.

See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n., 500 U.S. 507,516 (1991).

14.

431 U.S. 209 (1977).

15.

See id.at 212.

The Supreme Court has held that union workers may

constitutionally be compelled to subsidize the collective-bargaining agency because all union

employees benefit from the agency's work. See it at 219 (quoting Railway Employes Dep't
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,238 (1956)).
16. See id.
at 235-36.
17. Id. at 235.
18.
19.

496 U.S. 1 (1990).
California State Bar membership fees are required as a condition of practicing law

in the state of California. See id.
at 5.
20. A portion of membership fees were used by the California State Bar for lobbying
governmental agencies, including the legislature. See i.
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is ultimately to2 regulate the legal profession and improve the quality of
legal services." 1
From Abood and Keller, the Supreme Court in Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Association" established a three-prong test to decide whether
the nature of various union activities were such that objecting members
could constitutionally be compelled to subsidize them.' In holding that
the expenditures for lobbying activities were unconstitutionally
mandated, while the expenses for nonpolitical activities were sufficiently
related to the purpose of collective bargaining to compel funding, the
Court evaluated each activity to ensure that it "(1) [was] germane to
[the] collective-bargaining activity; (2) [was] justified by the
government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding free
riders; and (3) [did] not significantly add to the burdening of free speech
that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop. "24
The principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virgini? and Widmar v. Vincen?6
are instrumental in putting the issue of compelled funding into the
context of a university. The plaintiffs in Widmar claimed that their First
Amendment rights were violated when the University of Missouri
banned the student religious group from using university facilities that
are regularly made available for student meetings.'
In holding the
exclusion unconstitutional, the Court maintained that by making
university facilities available for student meetings, the University has
established a forum to accommodate all students.' Accordingly, the
University is not at liberty to. exclude a student organization based on
the content of the group's speech unless it can show that the exclusion is
narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest.'

21. Id at 13-14. The court acknowledged that it is difficult to determine which
activities are germane to the purpose of the mandatory funds and which activities are more
ideological in nature. See id. at 14.
22. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
23. See id. at 519. The Court further held that mandatory financial support was
constitutional even if the funded activities did not have a direct benefit on the dissenting
employees' bargaining unit. See id. at 519.
24. Id.
25. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
26. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
27. See id. at 266. All students attending the University of Missouri are required to pay
an activity fee that is contributed to the cost of providing facilities to student organizations.
See id. at 265.
28. See id. at 267.
29. See id. at 269. The University contended that it had a compelling interest in
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In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia withheld student activity
funds for payment of printing costs from a qualified student newspaper
solely because the publication "primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.', 30 The Court
held that the guideline justifying the University's denial of funds
31
amounted to a denial of the student organization's right of free speech.
In so doing, the Court reasoned that because the student activity fees
created a limited public forum,3 the University could not refuse to fund
the speech of a student organization on the basis of religious viewpoint
when it otherwise funded speech pertaining to the content of religion
within that forum. 3 The Court further stated that "to hold otherwise
would present a danger.., to speech from the chilling of individual
thought and expression. That danger is especially real in the University
setting, where the State acts against a backdrop and tradition of thought
and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophical
tradition. " 34
Guided by the precepts of the Supreme Court, several courts have
confronted the constitutional uses of mandatory student activity fees;
however, the circuits are decidedly split as to both the appropriate
analysis and outcome. The Second,35 Fourth.3 and Ninth Circuits have
maintaining separation of the church and the state, as mandated by the Establishment Clause
of the Constitution. See id. at 270. However, the court rejected this argument, holding that
"by creating a forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the
particular ideas aired there." Id. at 272 n. 10.
30. Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 822-23.
31. See id. at 837.
32. See id. at 829. "The creation and maintenance of a public forum can be seen as a
subsidy of speech that occurs on public property, such as public university campuses, that is
traditionally or by designation dedicated to public debate." Carolyn Wiggins, Note, A Funny
Thing Happens When You Pay for a Forum: Mandatory Student Fees To Support Political
Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE LJ.2009, 2022-23 (1994). The Rosenberger court
held that although this type of forum is more metaphysical that geographical, the same
principles apply. Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 830.
33. See Rosenberger, at 831-33. The distinction between content-based speech and
viewpoint-based speech is often times very subtle. A policy that regulates content-based
speech focuses on the general subject matter of the message conveyed. Viewpoint regulation
governs a particular view of the general subject matter. See Wiggins, supra note 32, at 2032.
"Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination." Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 829.
34. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 835.
35. See Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992) (seeking to enjoin university
from unconstitutionally distributing portion of mandatory student activity fees to a public
interest research group).
36. See Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983) (bringing action against
university officials for unconstitutionally allocating mandatory student fees to university's
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held that universities may constitutionally allocate compulsory students
fees to organizations whose speech some students find repugnant. The
Third' and Seventh39 Circuits have concluded that compelling objecting
students to subsidize political and ideological speech violates their First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The United
States Supreme Court will now have the opportunity to provide
guidance for those universities which are attempting to promote an
atmosphere for the expression of divergent opinions without infringing
upon the students' First Amendment freedoms.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CASE

In reaching its decision in Southworth v. Grebe,' the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals adhered to the compelled funding analysis set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Abood4' and Keller.42 Further, the
court found persuasive the line of cases holding that the mere existence
of incidental educational benefits of an organization's political and
ideological speech does not justify the burden placed on the dissenting
students' constitutional rights. ' Thus, the court ultimately held that the
university "cannot use the allocable portion of objecting student's
mandatory activity fees to fund organizations which engage in political
or ideological activities, advocacy, or speech. "4
The court began its analysis by referring to the basic First
Amendment tenets upon which this case is based: the right to freedom

newspaper).
37. See Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1999)
(objecting students sue university for imposing compulsory fees which fund a public interest
research group). The Rounds decision was handed down six years after the California
Supreme Court held that compelling students to fund organizations that engage in political
and ideological activity violates objecting students' First Amendment rights. See Smith v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1993).
38. See Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985) (objecting students challenge
university's policy of funding organizations that promote political and ideological speech).
39. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, reh'g denied, 157 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert granted sub nom. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 119 S. Ct.
1332 (1999).
40.

Id.

41. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
43. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 726 (citing Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir.
1985)); Smith v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1993).
44. See Southworth, 151 F.3d. at 733. The court also held that the eighteen challenged
organizations did in fact engage in political and ideological speech and activities. See id.
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of speech and the right not to be compelled to subsidize others' speech.45
The court acknowledged that although Rosenbergerdid not contemplate
the same constitutional issue as the one at hand, the Rosenberger court's
application of the Abood and Keller germaneness analysis was the
appropriate one.6 The court relied on the Lehnert court's three-prong
germaneness test to determine the constitutionality of the allocated
mandatory student fundsf
Therefore, the court examined the
compelled expenditures in light of whether (1) the funding of
organizations is germane to the government's legitimate interest in
education; (2) the state's interests in education are vital policy interests
sufficient to justify compelled-funding; and (3) the expenditure
significantly adds to the burden on speech inherent in any mandated fee
schemer'
In addressing whether the challenged expenditure is germane to the
government's interest,49 the court held that the University's asserted
interest in education is too broad to be germane and that such an
interpretation has been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court."
Even if the University's interest were not so extensive, the funding still
would not be germane because student fees are not even necessary to
the existence of most organizations. 2
Nevertheless, the overencompassing goal of education is not sufficiently germane to justify
compelled funding of private political and ideological groups, whose
speech offers only incidental educational benefit.
While it
acknowledged that the University's policy interest in education is vital,
the court concluded that the interest is not vital enough to compel
students to fund private organizations that engage in political and

45. See id. at 722 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Keller v.
State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990)).

46. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 722-23.
47. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
48. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 717. The court considered prongs two and three
despite the fact that the university failed to address them. See id. at 727 n.9.
49. The court stated that the threshold issue of the germaneness test is whether the
compelled funding is justified by a legitimate governmental interest. Yet, the court stated

that there was no need to answer the threshold question because the students do not oppose
the university's interest in the compelled funding of the private organizations. See id. at 724.
50. See id. at 725 ("[e]verything is in a sense educational.").
51. See id. at 724-25 (citing Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990) and Lehnert v.
Ferris Faculty Ass'n., 500 U.S. 507 (1991) as rejecting broad interpretation of germaneness).

52. The court stated that over seventy percent of the student organizations on the
university's campus do not apply for funding. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
53. See id.
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ideological speech.' The court also declined to consider whether the
government has a vital interest in allowing students to participate in the
university government.5 5 Again relying on Lehnert," the court reasoned
that because there is no common cause between the organizations which
espouse certain political and ideological views and the students who
disagree with those views, there is not a vital interest to justify the
funding.57 Moreover, the court distinguished the vital policy interest of
free-riders observed in Abood, stating that by allowing students and
non-students alike to join the private organizations, the University has
no legitimate concern that objecting students will receive the benefits of
those organizations without contributing funds. 9 Unlike unions, the
university's private organizations do not represent the student body, but
rather engage in activities to further their own political and ideological
beliefs.' Therefore, the free-rider problem is nonexistent in a university
setting.6
Finally, the court held that the burden upon the objecting students'
speech is severe because the organizations use the funds to garner the
support of the public in its endeavors and as an instrument for fostering
public adherence to an ideological point of view which the students find
objectionable. 2
Although the private organizations have the
constitutional right to engage in speech regarding highly emotional
issues, those students who disagree with the speech are not required by
the Constitution to subsidize it.' In drawing another analogy to the
reasoning in Abood, the court noted that when dissenting students are
forced to contribute to organizations with contrary beliefs, that funding
undermines the notion that every individual is entitled to the freedom of

54.

See id.

55.

See id.

56. See id. at 727-28 (noting that union and non-union members share the common
goal of labor peace).
57. See id. at 728 (intimating that the university's interest in free speech is undermined
by compelling objecting students to support political and ideological activities they disagree
with).
58. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
59. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728-29.
60. See id. at 728.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 729 (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n., 500 U.S. 507 (1991)).
63. See id. at 729-30. The court also discussed the importance of this principle which is
compounded by the fact that a university cannot discriminate in its allocation of funds. See id.
at 730 n.11.
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belief, thus creating a "crisis of the conscience." ' This crisis occurs even
if the funds do not directly subsidize the political and ideological activity
or if the University allocates the objecting students' fees to fund nonpolitical groups while designating the same amount of funding to the
political and ideological groups." It is also inconsequential that
objecting students can express their own views through the democratic
process of the student government.6 The end result is the same: the
First Amendment rights of the dissenting students are greatly
burdened.7
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's declaratory
judgment, yet disagreed with the district court's injunction.' The district
court properly held the University's proposed refund mechanism69 to be
inadequate because such a remedy would not protect objecting students
from being compelled to pay fees for political and ideological activities
with which they disagree." As is the case with unions, the University
has other available means by which to withhold dissenters' funds from
political and ideological organizations." However, the Seventh Circuit
also held that the district court's injunction ordered the University to
comply with a detailed criteria that went further than simply enjoining
the University from using objecting students funds for political and

64. Id. (quoting Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 117 S. Ct. 2130,2130 (1997)).

65. See iLat 731-732.
66. See id. at 732 (stating that the "First Amendment trumps the democratic process").
67. The court also addressed the university's comparison of using student funds with
the government's right to use public funds raised through taxation. See id. However, in
closely following the precedent set forth in Rosenberger, the court refused to equate the

student activity fees with a tax. See icL
68. See supra note 1.
69.

The refund mechanism would entail collecting the full student activity fund and

then later refunding that portion that it was not constitutionally permitted to expend. See
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 733 (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 443-445

(1984)).
70.

See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 733. The court also held that the district court

correctly excluded the plaintiffs contentions regarding the injunction that
each individual student, and not the University, "must have the final decision as to
whether to fund an advocacy group or not before any fees are paid to the
University" and that "[t]he university may not define private group advocacy as a
service to other students in order to require students to fund those groups."

Id. at 735.
71. See iL at 733 (noting that although the same administrative burdens exist for
unions, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the rebate system).
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ideological activities.' Although the district court has a great deal of
discretion when fashioning a remedy, the principles of federalism
mandate that "relief against a state be no broader than necessary to
remedy the constitutional violation."'
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit denied the University's petition
for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc. 74 The judges
dissenting from the denial for rehearing have discerned those issues
relied upon by other circuits yet not thoroughly addressed by the
Southworth court's holding. Because the United States Supreme Court
has granted certiori in the Southworth case, these issues may in fact play
a prominent role in the Court's constitutional analysis of compelled
student funding."
V. ANALYSIS
Mandatory student funding has constitutional implications not only
for the opposing students, but for the universities that will no longer
have the right to provide an atmosphere in which students can receive
information through the exchange of ideas and the students who will no
longer receive funding in order to express their ideas in that
atmosphere. By alleviating the burden on opposing students' First
Amendment rights, the court may have infringed upon the First
Amendment rights of others.
Because the Supreme Court has
"recognized that First Amendment rights must be analyzed in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment, " 76 it may be
compelled to balance the rights that exist on all sides of this issue.'
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a student activities
fund creates a forum.' Courts have further held that these funds are
permissible because the law confers upon universities great latitude "to
define and carry out their own educational missions." 9 These principles
72-

See id. at 733-734.

73.

Id. at 734.

74.

See Southworth v. Grebe, 157 F.3d 1127 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted 119 S. Ct. 1332

(1999).
75. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 119 S.Ct. 1332 (1999).
76. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
77. See Kari Thoe, Note, A Learning Experience: Discovering the Balance Between
Fees-Funded PublicForaand Compelled-Speech Rights at American Universities, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 1425, 1462 (1998).
78. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
79. Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 999 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,226 (1985)).
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provide the framework for how the compelled student funding issue has
been analyzed by every other court,' with the exception of the Seventh
Circuit. Although the Southworth court's holding was predicated on the
grounds that the constitutional infringement upon dissenting students is
not justified by the educational benefits that flow from the speech of
private organizations, the court failed to follow the Supreme Court's
pronouncement that the educational benefit inherent in that speech is
based on the greater cause of an open and neutral forum. Under this
analysis, objecting students are not subsidizing "what they don't
believe."0' Rather, they are funding a forum "designed to reflect the
reality that student life in its many dimensions includes the necessity of
wide-ranging speech and inquiry and that student expression is an
integral part of the University's educational mission."'
Thus, the
student activity fees are germane and essential to the vital university
interest in providing a forum.'
As the court noted, the private organizations that the students object
to funding only represent the views of their members.Y They represent
neither the students nor the University. When students contribute funds
to the Associated Students Of Madison (ASM), they are merely
subsidizing the group that promotes the forum itself, not the promotion
of the particular beliefs within the forum. Otherwise the students could
similarly claim that they are unconstitutionally compelled to fund
through tuition the speech of professors who espouse ideas with which
they disagree.'
Likewise, the student newspaper's expression of
particular views would violate the First Amendment rights of objecting
students, an aspect of the mandatory fee which the students in
Southworth do not challenge." Even if the end result of this compelled
funding placed a slight burden on dissenting student's free speech, the
"[g]overnment may abridge incidentally individual rights of free speech
and association when engaged in furthering the constitutional goal of
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open expression."'
80.
81.

See supranotes 25-39 and accompanying text.
Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717,731 (1998).

82.

Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 840.

83. See Southworth v. Grebe, 157 F.3d 1124,26 (7th Cir. 1998) (Rovner, J., dissenting),
cert. grantedsub nor. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. Southworth,. 119 S. Ct. 1332

(1999).
84. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728.
85.
86.
87.

See Southworth, 157 F.3d at 1125.
See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 721.
Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 480 (4 Cir. 1983) (quoting New York Times Co.
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Not only did the court's holding inadequately address the right of
the University to create a forum, but it entirely overlooked the interests
of those who have the right to use that forum. The court should have
thoroughly considered the competing First Amendment rights of those
objecting students, for whom the burden on free speech is slight, and the
entire student body that is free to express its views. In Rosenberger,the
Supreme Court held that once the university has opened a forum, it may
not enforce a content-based exclusion of speech unless such an exclusion
preserves the purpose of that forum.8 The holding of the Rosenberger
court also applies to the content of political and ideological speech: "the
money goes to a special fund from which any group of students.., can
draw for purposes consistent with the University's educational mission;
and to the extent the student is interested in speech, withdrawal is
permitted to cover the whole spectrum of speech, whether it manifests a
religious view, an antireligious view, or neither."' Just like the content
of religious speech, the university must permit the expression of political
and ideological speech in order to promote the "wide-ranging speech
and inquiry"' 9 that is the ultimate purpose of the forum.
The issue of content-based exclusion begs the question of what
constitutes political and ideological speech. Although the Southworth
court has prohibited the University from allocating objecting students
activity fees in order to fund organizations that engage in political or
ideological activities, it failed to provide the University with any
standard by which to determine the groups this proscription includes.
Without an interpretation of what political and ideological speech
entails, a broad refusal to fund could result in viewpoint-based
discrimination.9 ' Viewpoint discrimination, whereby the speech of an
organization is regulated because of its specific motivating ideology,? "is
presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within
the forum's limitations."9' Furthermore, the Supreme Court already
considers regulations that discriminate against particular controversial
subjects to be viewpoint based. 9' This outcome is likely to violate the
free speech of the University's organizations, thus subjecting the
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964)).
88.

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30.

89.
90.

Id. at 841.
Id. at 840.

91.

See Wiggins, supra note 32, at 2032.

92.
93.

See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829.
Id. at830.

94.

See Wiggins, supra note 32, at 2032.
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University to further litigation.95
As a result of a holding such as Southworth, universities will be
unable to pursue their educational mission through an open forum for
"thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and
philosophical tradition."" More importantly, students will be unable to
receive this educational benefit. Financial assistance is particularly
crucial for student organizations who support an unpopular view.' A
lack of funding will reduce the diversity of views expressed, the total
quantity of speech which can be funded, and the opportunity for
students to participate in student organization speech activities."
Finally, by stifling the free exchange of political and ideological views,
students will have less opportunity to not only be exposed to varying
ideas, but to learn tolerance of those ideas they disagree with most."
Silencing an entire university and inhibiting the exchange of ideas is a
perverse way to preserve First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association.
VI. CONCLUSION

The freedoms of speech and association provided by the First
Amendment cause a conflict between those who desire to express their
beliefs and those who disagree with those beliefs. In the Southworth
case, the Seventh Circuit found that dissenting students' First
Amendment rights take precedence over private organizations that
engage in political and ideological activity. Now, the Supreme Court
will have occasion to consider the ramifications of such a decision on
this country's universities. Thus, it will soon be learned whether our
universities are still truly a forum for a "marketplace of ideas. "'00
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